Highlights from the Israel Democracy Institute's annual report
2019 Israel Democracy Index published by IDI
This week, the IDI published its annual Israel Democracy Index, with highlights available online. What follows is a selection of Hiddush’s highlights from this Index, which focus on significant observations in the area of religion & state.
10/01/2020 01:09
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This week, the IDI published its annual Israel Democracy Index, with highlights available online What follows is a selection of Hiddush’s highlights from this Index, which are not meant to detract from the importance of the overall breadth and depth of the document, but rather to focus on significant observations in the area of religion & state (limiting our analysis to the Jewish community, which is responsible for policy decisions regarding the alignment of religion & state. A more comprehensive analysis would, of course, include the positions of the non-Jewish minority).
We see the Israel Democracy Index as a complementary source to Hiddush’s Israel Religion & State Index, and beyond the specific issues it covers, it presents us with a needed realization: Israeli Jewish society is highly divided. It often takes drastically opposed positions on key questions that confront Israel’s state and society. It is long overdue that Israel chose and act upon one of these opposing paradigms. Clearly, the overwhelming majority of Jews have made their choice, but it is just as clear that Israel’s politicians, for the most part, are willing to shut their eyes, ears, and hearts to this choice. The political leadership imposes norms and practices dictated by a religiously fundamentalist minority, solely because of its political clout, as well as the refusal of the political powers that be to collaborate in order to free Israel from this antithesis to its Jewish-democratic identity.
The failure of Israeli politicians to date to heed the people’s voices, including those of their own constituents, and the politicians’ turning their backs upon Israel’s founding promise of freedom of religion and conscience and full social and political equality, regardless of religion, gender, or race, undermines the state’s democratic fabric and erodes Jewish peoplehood and Israel’s bond with the Diaspora. As we have noted in recent months, the September and upcoming March elections in Israel may present a window of opportunity for change, but the jury is still out, and some disturbing indications may potentially point to more of the same.
One of the tragic consequences of the unresolved conflict between religion and state in Israel and the excessive clout enjoyed by the religious parties is the public departure from the balanced formula of Israel as a “Jewish and democratic state”.
One of the tragic consequences of the unresolved conflict between religion and state in Israel and the excessive clout enjoyed by the religious parties is the public departure from the balanced formula of Israel as a “Jewish and democratic state”. Whereas in the early IDI Democracy Indices, the majority of Israeli Jews expressed their preference for the joint, holistic option of both “Jewish and democratic”, in recent years we find that different religious sectors of the Jewish community are growing apart, implying their shared despair and ensuing willingness to abandon this formula.
In response to the question: “Israel is defined as a Jewish and democratic state. Is there or isn’t there, in your view, an appropriate balance between the Jewish component and the democratic component?” Only 20% of the ultra-Orthodox and 22% of the secular maintain that there is a correct balance between the two, while 64% of the secular maintain that the Jewish component is too strong, and a similar percentage of the ultra-Orthodox maintain that the democratic component is too strong. Over all, only 31% of Israeli Jews see the two as properly balanced, whereas 41.3% see the Jewish component as too strong, and 20.2% consider the democratic component too strong.
Much debate and multiple surveys have taken place, gauging the relationship between Israel and world Jewry. The current Index asks the question: “In making important decisions, should the government of Israel take into consideration the positions of Diaspora Jews?” Overall, 59.7% held that it need not. While the actual percentages differed, all religious subgroups in Israeli society from ultra-Orthodox to secular shared this view. Unfortunately, presenting the question in this manner misses the observation we have made in running a few more nuanced and focused polls.
What we have been able to determine repeatedly and conclusively is that when the question is focused on matters of advancing religious freedom and equality, the overwhelming majority of Israeli Jews welcome Diaspora Jewish engagement in challenging the state’s current discriminatory and coercive policies. It is therefore important to point this out because asking the question in such a general fashion evokes different reactions, and one can understandably feel empathy with Israelis who react negatively to the idea that the Israeli government should take into consideration Diaspora Jewish views as to making security decisions, which may impact the lives and deaths of Israelis.
Therefore, while recent polls conducted by a variety of entities have pointed to a similar or comparable result to that of the IDI Index, we still maintain and urge other concerned organizations to pose a similar question to that which Hiddush poses. They will find for themselves that most Israelis see a difference between considering Diaspora Jewish views before Israel makes general policy decisions and the wide support for active involvement by Diaspora Jewry in partnering with Israelis to advance core democratic values and pluralistic Jewish views, in a reality that is often dictated by minority, fundamentalist religious groups, which run contrary the public’s will and Israel’s founding promise of religious freedom and equality.
In gauging the level of public trust in the different state institutions, we find 53.3% of the secular Jewish public expressing trust in the Supreme Court, compared to 97.7% of the ultra-Orthodox and 86.7% of the Zionist Orthodox expressing distrust of it.
In gauging the level of public trust in the different state institutions, we find 53.3% of the secular Jewish public expressing trust in the Supreme Court, compared to 97.7% of the ultra-Orthodox and 86.7% of the Zionist Orthodox expressing distrust of it. 62.4% of the general Jewish population expressed its distrust of the Supreme Court, compared to 35.6% that trust it. Variance of opinion regarding the Supreme Court is also apparent when one compares the views based on political outlooks. Whereas 52% of the right distrusts the Supreme Court, 64% of the center and 55% of the left have trust in it.
As to the assessment of the status of the different public services, the divergence of opinion based on religious identity is very apparent. Whereas 58% of the secular maintain that the status of the court system is good, 80% of the ultra-Orthodox and 58.6% of the Zionist hold that it is not good. This is undoubtedly connected with another clash between the two groups over the legitimacy of the civil judiciary, as compared to the preference for a Torah state, which would have courts run according to religious Jewish law.
The secular and ultra-Orthodox share distrust of the Knesset (72% of secular and 69.6% of ultra-Orthodox), distrust of the Government
(79.7% of secular and 63% of ultra-Orthodox; as to the general Jewish public – 67.5% expressed distrust and only 30% expressed trust), and distrust of the political parties (76.8% of secular, 68% of Zionist Orthodox, and 69.6% of ultra-Orthodox; as to the general Jewish public – 75.5% distrust and 14% trust it).
Unfortunately, the IDI once again did not include the Chief Rabbinate on its list of institutions. In the past, when they included it in 2017, 96.8% of the secular expressed distrust, whereas 58.3% of the ultra-Orthodox and 49.5% of the Zionist Orthodox expressed trust in it. And in 2013, 71.2% of the secular expressed distrust, whereas 71% of the ultra-Orthodox and 74.7% of the Zionist Orthodox expressed their trust. It should be mentioned that in Hiddush’s 2019 Religion & State Index, we posed the question “in whom do you have the most trust?”, and the breakdown of the overall Jewish population was as follows: 36% most trust the Supreme Court, 11%: the Chief Rabbinate, 10%: the government, 6%: the Knesset, and 37%: none.
Both Hiddush’s data and that of the IDI regarding the relative levels of trust in the relevant public institutions demonstrate how boastful and ungrounded the repeated assaults of both the secular and the ultra-Orthodox spokespeople of the outgoing government coalition against the Supreme Court truly are. They claim that the Supreme Court has lost the public’s trust and doesn’t represent anybody other than itself, whereas this is actually true of the politicians themselves.
The Israel Democracy Index included a question as to which tension the public considers to be the strongest in Israel society. Whereas the top tension was identified by the general Jewish population as being between the political left and right (40.5%), the second highest tension was between religious & secular (24.2%), followed by the tension between Jews and Arabs (23.5%). As to the other tensions that were considered, they are clearly perceived as tensions of the past, which are not pressing Israeli society today: between rich & poor (4.1%), between Sephardi and Ashkenazi (2.9%). To a great degree, these findings are comparable to those of Hiddush’s Religion & State Index. However, in the Hiddush Index, the secular/ultra-Orthodox conflict was perceived as comparably acute and even slightly more acute than that of the political left and right. The Hiddush Index looked at domestic Jewish conflicts, and it did not examine the tensions between Jews and Arabs.
As we know, the ethnic tension between Ashkenazi and Sephardi is often invoked in election campaigns – primarily by the Shas party and often (indirectly) in conjunction with the Likud. The above mentioned data clearly indicates that the general public no longer feels that this is a major societal tension. It is therefore interesting to see the response to an additional question posed in the Index, seeking public feedback to the statement: “the tension between Ashkenazi and Sephardi has not disappeared only because politicians are making use of it for their own ends,” namely stoking the ethnic fires to advance their parties. 61% of the Jewish public agrees with this disturbing statement.
Whereas 55% of the Jewish population maintains that the Jewish society in Israel has become more religious in recent years, only 14.4% think the opposite.
Whereas 55% of the Jewish population maintains that the Jewish society in Israel has become more religious in recent years, only 14.4% think the opposite. 27.1% do not see any change. If you break it down by religious identity, you find that over 68% of the secular see society as becoming more religious, whereas 36% of the ultra-Orthodox see it as turning more secular. Only 31.4% of the ultra-Orthodox agree that it’s turning more religious.
A vexing question that appeared in the landmark Pew study of Israeli society and is raised in the current Israel Democracy Index is: “Should the government encourage Arab emigration from the country?” As in the Pew study, a marked difference between the positions of secular and religious is notable. Whereas over 74% of the secular disagree, 64% of the ultra-Orthodox and 52% of the Zionist Orthodox agree.
An encouraging finding can be seen in the response to the question “should all Israeli schools teach both the Jewish and the Arab perspectives regarding the history of the conflict between them?” 70.9% of all Jews respond in the affirmative. Yet the divergence of Jews according to their religious identities is very telling. Whereas 80% of the secular agree with this, 55% of the ultra-Orthodox disagree. Interestingly, the Index found agreement expressed 54.7% of the Zionist Orthodox and over 70% of the traditional Jewish population.
As Orthodox Ministers of Education have occupied the Ministry in recent years, they have often been criticizing for diverting massive amounts of funding to religious indoctrination in the non-religious public school system. It is interesting to see the answers to the following question: “Do you support or oppose the following statement: it is preferable to reduce civics and democracy studies and dedicate more hours to Jewish history and love of the land?” Overall, 58% of the Jewish population opposed this statement. Opposition was expressed by 81% of the secular, but support was expressed by 85.4% of the ultra-Orthodox and 59% of the Zionist Orthodox.
The IDF provides a number of areas of contention. Among them is the perception of the IDF as the “people’s army” and the question of compulsory service versus professional military. A large majority of the Jewish population sees the definition of the IDF as the “people’s army” as accurate (75.6%). That view is shared only by 48.3% of the ultra-Orthodox, compared to 73.4% of the secular and 92% of the Zionist Orthodox. Most Jews (54.5%) oppose the proposal to abolish mandatory service and establish the IDF as a professional army. Looking at the breakdown according to religious identity, one finds that over 82% of the ultra-Orthodox support this, for it would relieve them of the ongoing public controversy regarding their mass dodging of the draft. This is opposed by 61.5% of the secular 64% of the Zionist Orthodox.
Another contentious concept considered by the Index is that of the “Chosen People”. The survey measured agreement and disagreement with the statement: “The Jewish people is the ‘Chosen People’. Therefore it is superior to other nations.” 56.8% of all Jews disagreed, whereas 40% agreed. The breakdown by religious identity reveals that 82% of the secular disagree, while 89% and 68% of the Zionist Orthodox agree.
Data for the Israel Democracy Index courtesy of Guttman Center for public opinion and policy research at the Israel Democracy Institute.
We want to use this opportunity to remind you of another important survey published by IDI, regarding Haredi society, which we publicized recently.